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Effect of Dynamic Politics on The Sustainability of Local Democracy Legal Politics

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to provide information regarding the influence of dynastic politics on democracy. This research strategy is a normative research strategy. Literature reviews, books, journals, papers, and relevant laws and regulations were utilized to collect data for this study. In a democratic nation, particularly Indonesia, dynastic politics have been prevalent for a long time and are a legacy of the New Order administration. In certain regions of Indonesia, dynasty politics have risen rapidly. It is believed that the practice of dynasty politics impedes the mobility of the people to participate in the phases of the General Election for Regional Heads. In addition, dynastic politics has the potential to corrupt monarchs or incumbents by bolstering the political authority and interests of their families and relatives. This is due to the lack of influence the community has on the electoral process. Observing the evolution of dynastic political practices, this is unquestionably a crucial highlight for every community. Consequently, the concept of checks and balances between the government and society is deemed essential for ensuring the continuation of the battle for leadership transitions.

Keywords: Dynasty Politics; Democracy; Law

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INTRODUCTION

Identifying a collection of characteristics that are systematically related to the scientific and political concept of "good democracy" is a difficult task (Sousa et al., 2021). Citizenship is the foundation of democracy (Fischer & Shoaib, 2019). The core of democratic theory, for the most part, rests in the fact that it is founded on the essential character of man, his role in society, and the process of state growth. In this context, it is critical to recognize that inhabitants residing in the same administrative unit in the same region require the services they require and, as a result, require a representative body through which they may express their socio-cultural, organizational, and other concerns (Reznik et al., 2019). The quality of local democracy is determined by three major factors. Voters who are able to exercise their right to vote Participants in the election who gain political clout. Furthermore, election coordinators who ensure that the

technical stages and outcomes are consistent with the foundation of a democratic election (A. Habibi, 2020).

Indonesia became a democratic country during the reform period following the fall of the New Order era, one of which was the holding of honest, fair, free, and secret elections in line with the will and conscience of the people, as promised by the constitution (Setyagama, 2021). The fulfillment of political participation is one of the indications of the application of a democratic country's highest power. This demonstrates that in a state, authority is exerted by the people, or what is known as the concept of popular sovereignty, which is demonstrated by their participation in General Elections (GE) (Madjid & AS, 2022). People should have more opportunities to participate in the political process in an ideal democracy. This implies that there is plenty of room for the entire community to compete for political posts spanning from regional to national levels in compliance with existing rules and regulations (Susanti, 2017a). In other words, if there is familial politics, it automatically eliminates the possibility of candidates from outside being able to compete successfully (Arianto, 2021).

Political dynasties have existed since the time of President Soeharto. Political dynasties have grown stronger for Suharto's extended family and those close to him during the time of Indonesia's Second President. Since the opening of the regional autonomy faucet till now, the phenomenon of political dynasties has extended across the regions (Sukri, 2020). This has a detrimental influence on the community's social, economic, and political life, therefore the birth of reform has become the cornerstone of hope for a better life in the state. However, the dominance of the political elite, who tended to form political dynasties, did not stop with the fall of the New Order. Indeed, several studies show that the practice of political dynasties is becoming more prevalent in the post-reform age, both at the national and municipal levels (Muksin et al., 2019).

One feature of strategic policy is its basic incompatibility with wide citizen engagement, much alone allowing for any type of self-government (Vogelpohl, 2018). The transition from a centralized system phase to a regional autonomy system has an influence on the state's, in this case the central government's, declining responsibility towards the regions. Regional rulers attempt to sustain power without relying on the national authority. The ability to master current resources has the capacity to sustain its power. This potential may be achieved if the available resources are managed and empowered. On the other hand, democracy, with its multi-party system and direct election process, no longer prevents everyone from voting in the general election. These two factors subsequently result in a system of power relations. Every communal group creates patterns of power relations (Nugroho, 2018). The transition from representational democracy to direct democracy has had a significant impact on the political conduct of Indonesian politicians. Direct democracy (where people directly elect candidates for national or local political leaders) has occurred not just at the national level, such as direct presidential elections since 2004, but also at the municipal level (K. H. Dewi, 2018).

As in many other nations, decentralization implies that decisions made at the local level have a greater influence on people's everyday lives; hence, the topic of how democracy works at this level receives special attention (Bergström et al., 2019). Political dynasty in the classic political sense, in which the monarch attempts to place his family, relatives, and relations in crucial positions in order to construct a political empire inside the government (Fitri, 2019). Dynasty politics is founded in the political

practice of the family exercising a monopoly of power and seeing public institutions as private family property that is passed down from generation to generation (Dewi et al., 2021). The fruitful practice of dynasty politics demonstrates that political parties do not select candidates for regional leaders and deputy regional chiefs in a democratic and open way. According to a review of the literature, most political parties are pragmatic in that they install candidates with high popularity (level of recognition of voters to candidates) and electability (voters' desire to vote) based on public opinion poll results, and they ensure that people can finance themselves (Fitriyah, 2020). The use of family politics as the major entrance in political recruiting is sufficient to demonstrate that family politics occurs wherever, at any time, and is utilized by anybody with significant authority to control resources (Fokatea & Mas'udi, 2020).

When a government leader comes from a political dynasty, persons with particular links are placed in crucial positions in government. The presence of sentiments that are not independent of the special connection might limit oversight on task implementation and government administration reporting (Aji & Pratolo, 2018). Several writers have also demonstrated a link between improved performance and more favorable assessments of democracy, albeit there is no consensus on how performance should be judged (Christiansen, 2018). The link between democracy and inclusive growth is a little tangled. On the one hand, democracy is based on systems and processes that allow the state to respond to the demands of its population. This system, it may be claimed, could lead to increased investment in human capital and more fair socioeconomic outcomes. Democracy, on the other hand, is prone to policy stagnation and myopia. Insecure tenure, for example, and time restrictions make it difficult to combine short-term objectives and vested interests with reform efforts necessary to foster equitable growth (Mendoza et al., 2019). Political corruption is the mother of all types of corruption in the state structure, and it can have an impact on the implementation process and the quality of democracy (M. Habibi, 2022).

The notion of political kinship is seen to have the ability to stymie open and participatory political circulation (Prianto, 2016). Political dynasties do not exist in a democracy since our constitution guarantees the right of every person to vote and be elected. As a result, every citizen has the right to hold political office if he is chosen and trusted by the people he will govern (Pamungkas, 2018). A dynasty, even if dominant and within a few generations, is no guarantee of continued political control (Ruud, 2018). While being born into a political family is a random event since it is impossible to pick a family at birth, members of a political family's decision to run for government is not decided exogenously. As a result, confounding factors must be controlled for in the study. However, it was unclear what muddled the link between the candidates' familial origins and their campaign tactics (Muraoka, 2018). Local government reform necessitates the strengthening of democracy, as well as the improvement of justice and the well-being of local communities. The establishment of regional head elections is one strategy for improving local democracy. Every five years, there is a rotation of regional leadership through GE (Aminah et al., 2020). To win a regional head election in a democracy, a candidate must be able to win the hearts and minds of the people. People seeking authority must endeavor to win the hearts of the people in order to obtain the trust of the people in order to lead in regional executive roles. As a result, in order to achieve power, the challenger must first establish defense confidence and then grab control (Tiran, 2021).

METHODS

A sort of legal research employed in this study is normative legal research. Methods will be used for normative legal research, with an emphasis on library law research employing library materials, as well as pertinent laws and regulations. A descriptive technique is utilized in this legal research to describe the phenomena of dynasty politics in Indonesia. Legal provisions in the Human Rights Law, the Election Law, and secondary legal resources pertaining to books, literature, legal expert publications, and pertinent doctrines shall be used as main legal materials in writing, assembling, and presenting legal research. In this study, a document study is used to collect legal documents (library study). A systematic interpretation approach was used to analyze primary and secondary legal documents, which were then interpreted with the formulation of research concerns connected to the phenomena of dynastic political traditions in Indonesia (Mukti & Rodiyah, 2020). The primary data sources are documents of the following types: press releases, media reporting, policy testimony, legislative legislation analysis, legislative or utility commission testimony (Hess, 2019). The gathered data is then modified to the issue formulation and described using descriptive analysis (Muhlis, 2021).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Dynasty Politics' Influence on Democracy

The fall of the new order brought many changes to various aspects of life, one of which had a significant impact on the structure of government and the dynamics of politics in Indonesia. Reform is a means of achieving the ideals desired by the Indonesian people by echoing democratic principles in it. This is because democracy is seen as the most ideal social system since it guarantees equality and freedom to all citizens. In line with this, Abraham Lincoln stated that democracy is governance of the people, by the people, and for the people. The interests, roles, and opinions of the people who are the major spearhead in a democratic society are dreams that are fulfilled so that the state may continue to exist and satisfy the people's aspirations (Silaban & Astrika, 2013). Indeed, the highest value in democracy elevates people's aspirations to the top of the priority list.

The General Election (GE) is one method of putting democracy into action. GE is one method of gathering people's voices in selecting persons to represent people's voices in the Legislative Institution and to lead in the Executive Institution, both at the central and regional levels (Pahlevi, 2015). This democratic contestation is a type of democratic party election that is held every five years. Aside from GE, the direct decentralization of Regional Head Elections (RHE) is evidence of democracy's growth. The community's participation in directly electing their regional heads demonstrates that community participation is highly valued in the reform era. However, this struggle for power also presents dynastic politics, which has both positive and negative consequences in practice.

As a democratic country, Indonesia highlights the existence of dynastic politics, which prompts concern about the incompatibility of political power, indicating that there are flaws in the state's implementation of democracy. Even Marcuz Mietxher believes that dynasties have had a role in the implementation of current politics in Indonesia. He saw dynastic politics as a poisonous threat to democracy's long-term

viability. This is due to the fact that democratic practice diminishes government supervision (Gunanto, 2020). Dynastic politics arises as a result of someone's power being established by providing possibilities for his family to continue the power that has been built and not being taken over by someone else. As a result, the dynastic politics that were established have the goal of ensuring that the administration that will be occupied will be sustained by individuals who still have familial links to the prior power holders (Anggraini & Riharjo, 2017). As a result, other communities' ability to engage in the political process is limited. Existing democratic values appear to be eroding, indicating the erosion of the intended democracy.

The dynasty politics that developed in Indonesia may be compared to an octopus, with the network constructed on kinship. This occurred as a result of the ability granted to regions to manage their own territories through regional autonomy, which culminated in the rise of individuals who developed their influence into a political dynasty. The political strategy of the newly created dynasty was to win power and consolidate the power that was already in place by delegating authority to others with whom he had familial ties so that his influence would not be lost. It is obvious that there will be restrictions if dynastic politics is established in a society that places a high value on democratic values. Most individuals who desire to acquire power indirectly create strength so that the power they have earned remains in their hands.

In Indonesia, dynasty politics has been practiced for a long time, according to statistics released by the Nagara Institute, which reveals that in 2020, there were around 124 candidates who participated in the RHE concurrently and were caught up in dynastic politics. The candidates are evenly distributed among Indonesia's 270 election districts. The type of dynastic politics that develops undoubtedly includes familial relationships such as husband, wife, children, and relatives or relatives at both the federal and provincial levels. This is a regular occurrence among Indonesians. Of course, dynasty politics may run wild in Indonesian politics for a reason. There are several elements that impact the prevalence of dynastic politics, including:

- a. Article 43 paragraph (1) of Law Number 39 of 1999 respecting Human Rights contains the provisions governing the right to be chosen and elect a person. According to the article, "every person has the right to be elected and to vote in general elections on the basis of equal rights, using direct, general, free, secret, honest, and fair voting in accordance with the rules of the legislation."
- b. Revocation of Article 7 letter r of Law No. 8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law No. 1 of 2015 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors to become Laws via Judicial Review at the Court Constitution. According to Constitutional Court Decision No. 33/PUU-XII/2015, the article does not have binding legal force, and the entire community has a constitutional right to progress to election contestation without regard to the relationship with whom one of the officials has a familial link (Tanjung & Faizal, 2021).
- c. Members of a political party. Not occasionally, there is a breakdown in the regeneration of political parties while hiring competent and capable people. Because of the congestion, political parties have adopted a pragmatic approach, nominating candidates from the families of present leaders. One of the primary factors is the high electability and ease of advancement.
- d. The standard of public education remains low. This has an impact on how people

vote on election day. If people solely vote based on popularity and bloodline, it will undoubtedly have an impact on the survival of dynasty politics in Indonesia.

These are the driving forces behind the growth of dynasty politics in Indonesia. This has been demonstrated in a number of agencies throughout Indonesia. For example, consider the dynasty politics that transpired in South Sulawesi under Yasin Limpo's tenure as governor. His wife, Hj. Nurhayati Yasin Limpo, and their children, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Haris Yasin Limpo, and Irman Yasin Limpo, all of whom occupy executive and legislative positions in the government, are implicated (Rusnaedy & Purwaningsih, 2018). Furthermore, dynasty politics happened in Banten, particularly Ratu Atut Chosiyah, who served as Governor of Banten for two times. Ratu Atut pulled his family into Banten politics, including his children, sons-in-law, and grandchildren who hold administrative and parliamentary roles (Effendi, 2018).

The prevalence of dynastic politics in Indonesia has led in the formation of numerous dynastic political paradigms. In Indonesia, numerous dynastic political models have emerged, including the regeneration model, the cross-chamber dynasty model, and the cross-regional dynasty model (Haliim & Hakim, 2020). The first model is a form of political regeneration in which candidates with familial links to pre-existing leaders are nominated. For example, suppose a leader completes his leadership time and delegated authority to one of his family members, such as parents or siblings, to carry on his leadership baton (Akbar & Purnomo, 2019). The second form is the cross-room dynasty model, in which the political system exists because one of the leaders or public officials still maintains familial or family links with them. For example, one family has posts in both the legislative and the government in the same territory. Finally, there is the cross-regional model. In this approach, dynasty politics is used to extend power territory. This is accomplished by relocating one of the families to another location to serve as a public official. In other words, the family consolidates authority in many or distinct locations. The advent of multiple dynastic political models resulted in both beneficial and bad effects on the body of Indonesian democracy. The following are some of the good effects that may be attributed to the presence of this political dynasty:

- 1) Good performance that is outstanding in the eyes of the community will establish trust in the leader, giving families who will engage in the realm of politics an edge. The good influence on society happens because public faith in the previous leader has increased, so that the new candidate's social capital inherited from the former leader's family will become the candidate's obligation to his people (Muksin et al., 2019).
- 2) The political capital required to advance to the position of leader cannot be isolated from the experience gained, especially if it is acquired within the context of a family that knows politics and government dynamics. As a result, candidates from dynastic politics may have the competence and credibility to serve as public officials.
- 3) Articulation of ideas or improved programs to create the community can be maintained more consistently. Because these ideals and programs may be achieved through family and relatives who are involved in politics through ties or networks between families (Gunanto, 2020).

Essentially, dynasty politics leads to conduct to maintain morality and ethics in government administration. As a result, the implications and ideas that form in society

are not solely motivated by a desire for dominance. The dynastic political events that happened, on the other hand, had a greater negative influence owing to the high number of incidents and infractions that did not match the community's expectations. The existence of this dynasty politics has a number of negative consequences, including:

- a) Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (CCN) may all be born from dynastic politics (Susanti, 2017b). Because if the candidate from the dynasty lacks competence, quality, ethics, or credibility in leading the government, the possibility of carrying out CCN increases. This is due to the fact that with dynasty politics, it will be simpler to execute trades due to the advantages of their relationships.
- b) Dynastic politics has the potential to undermine the role of checks and balances in governance (Mietzner, 2009). Because it is indisputable that if one family holds executive and legislative seats, the performance of the two institutions would suffer.
- c) Dynastic politics can make it more difficult for the general population to engage in government (Bathoro, 2011). This is owing to political dynasties' strong political networks and the benefits of social capital, which have restricted political recruiting to persons outside the dynasty.
- d) When dynastic politics is prevalent, there is a possibility that numerous policies may be enacted that favor the dynasty (Haliim & Hakim, 2020). In other words, policies are formed only on the basis of the group's interests, rather than the will and wants of the people.

The positive and bad consequences of dynasty politics are a predictable outcome for Indonesia as a democracy. A democratic system that allows freedom to all individuals can provide advantages and serve as a boomerang for Indonesia's political dynamics. In this celebration of democracy, the GE system, as a venue for channeling people's voices, becomes an arena of competence and a site of existence. Indeed, dynastic politics will not be a major issue if political parties build political recruiting that is concerned with more than just popularity, but also the integrity and quality of candidates. On the other hand, if political party recruitment is solely concerned with electability without regard for the integrity and qualifications of candidate candidates on the basis of dynasties, it will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the sustainability of politics, which in turn has an impact on the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia.

What happened in Indonesia, on the other hand, had a greater detrimental influence on dynasty politics. It is demonstrated by the number of examples that have happened in various locations, making the power dynasties wielded even more potent. This has an effect on the lack of competition in GE and RHE, demonstrating the weakness of democracy in Indonesia. The expansion of CCN, along with the lack of a checks and balances system, has led in democratic weaknesses. The presence of dynastic politics would harm democracy, which is supposed to generate leaders with integrity, quality, and competence in order to promote effective and efficient government administration. In other words, dynasty politics may become a virus or sickness that wreaks havoc on Indonesia's democratic process.

2. Political Law and Dynastic Politics in the Region

There is no constitutional limitation on the practice of dynasty politics at both the national and local government levels. The state of Indonesia is a state of law, according to Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution. This article requires that all acts and

implementation in the Republic of Indonesia be based on relevant legislation. It governs not just residents but also government acts that must and must be founded on applicable laws or regulations. The desired government scheme comprises not only political authority in carrying out its responsibilities and authorities, but also government acts in the succession process of transitioning leadership of an area, which is carried out and carried out through RHE (Nika, 2021).

The process of transferring government authority in a region is critical for the long-term viability of democracy and the wheels of regional leadership. If facts of fraud or breaches of the law are discovered during the implementation of RHE, this is deemed undemocratic and should be repeated. Efforts to maximize the implementation of democracy through RHE must always include complete community engagement in order to represent that the implementation is a kind of accommodation for the community's interests (Huda, 2011). Furthermore, in a democratic society, the government is needed to constantly be prepared to accommodate the people's wishes, and the government is also banned from acting arbitrarily on its power (Budiardjo, 2008). This is undoubtedly a reflection of the relationship between the norms of law and the ideals of democracy in the conduct of national and state life.

In principle, democracy is a representation of individuals' freedom to select and accommodate their own interests in a country. Every society's freedom of political speech is included in this. Democracy is a reflection of the right to collective freedom, which includes the duty to ensure and shape the future of a more prosperous and progressive society. Of course, it is not restricted to that; in a democracy, it also ensures the freedom of criticism procedures (Hamidi et al., 2009). As a result, as people who follow the constitutional mandate, they must always uphold the dignity of democracy by engaging in participation, one of which is being active in the succession of power transfer or leadership at both the national and regional levels. GE and RHE are processes that potential leaders or regional heads might use to earn social legitimacy from the community.

3. The Legality of Dynastic Political Practice in Indonesia

Jimly Asshiddiqie contended that, in principle, every state administration should only serve the entire community. He went on to say that a good and ideal country is one whose implementation is carried out with the broadest possible participation of the community (Asshiddiqie, 2006). The community's engagement in the execution of regional elections or democracy is undoubtedly a reflection of the community's aspirations or ambitions. This is certainly a point of view and a criterion for analyzing and deciding the government's long-term viability (Atmadja, 2015). In the meanwhile, community participation in the implementation of democracy is one of the supporting aspects for the implementation of checks and balances. The implementation of this concept is thought important in order to monitor and assess any government action that leads to the common good or to the interests of the political elite solely.

The political elite in issue is a group of people with political power, which includes the formation of political dynasties. The ruler's endeavor to maintain political power in a certain territory is known as dynasty politics. This perseverance can be manifested via himself, by strategically positioning his family, relatives, and relations with the goal of constructing or building a political empire in an area or country (Agustinus, 2015). This is unquestionably a political tactic that has taken place in

Indonesia. Following the issuing of the Constitutional Court's Decision No. 33/PUU-XII/2015, the practice of dynasty politics has been authorized. The Court ruled that the provisions of Article 7 letter r of Law No. 8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law No. 1 of 2015 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors that were tested were contrary to the 1945 Constitution. This is evident in one of the legal considerations of the Panel of Judges of the Constitutional Court, which considered this problem in light of the requirements of Article 27 paragraph (1), Article 28D paragraph (1) and (3), and Article 28I of the 1945 Constitution.

According to the terms of the relevant laws and regulations, there is no ban on exercising dynastic politics at the national and local government levels. The provisions of laws and regulations create chances for every person to work in government, including political office. According to the laws and regulations, this is permissible as long as the attainment process is carried out in compliance with and does not contradict the existing legal requirements. The Constitutional Court's Decision No. 33/PUU-XII/2015, as indicated, stipulates that families, relatives, and even groups of detainees have the same chance and position in the RHE contestation. The presence of this ruling attests to the implementation of the ideal of equality in government and law. Despite the fact that laws and regulations have offered possibilities for all citizens, it is regarded important to have oversight efforts in order to realize RHE as intended and expected.

4. The Negative Effects of Dynastic Political Practices

The creation of space and opportunity for the practice of dynastic politics in Indonesia would undoubtedly necessitate the most vigilant monitoring efforts from both institutions and the people. This is because the practice of dynastic politics is based on the incumbent's family and kin. Lord Acton once said, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely," which indicates that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts. Lord Acton's position was then bolstered by Klitgaard's argument, which formulated a theory of the occurrence of corruption caused by the existence of a monopoly of power by the leadership (monopoly of power) coupled with the amount of power possessed (discretion of official) without adequate supervision (minus accountability), resulting in the desire to act arbitrarily or corruptly. According to Lord Acton, the pattern of monitoring in the practice of dynastic politics must be applied in such a way that it follows the corridor established in the appropriate laws and regulations. Supervision is also anticipated to be capable of preventing fraud in the execution of dynastic political activities that can undermine the face of democracy and injury or impair public interests in all sectors.

In truth, the concept of equality guaranteed by the relevant legislation is not only construed narrowly (limited to equality in the government sector and before the law), but it is also designed so that every community can enjoy all state facilities. The State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (SREB) and the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (RREB) are two examples of state infrastructures. The SREB and RREB are expected to be used in accordance with their objectives, one of which is state and regional development. This is not easy to achieve, however, because there are still deviations from its proper use. One of the exceptions to its application is the practice of dynastic politics. It is true that SREB and RREB have been used as state facilities to benefit candidates. The use of social assistance funding is one of the most common misuses of funds by incumbents in the electoral succession (Tanjung & Faizal, 2021).

This demonstrates the powerful role of power in sustaining political interests in the RHE contestation. However, it is important to note that it is difficult to prove. However, evidence and facts reveal a large growth prior to RHE (Tanjung & Faizal, 2021).

The aforementioned manipulative tactics are connected to a region's series of leadership shifts. The debate of dynastic politics at the regional level is considerably different from the discussion of dynastic politics at the national (central) level. The system used in the regional arena employs the figuritas familism approach to ensure success in the practice of dynastic politics. Familism is composed of three supporting elements: first, the figure (personalism); second, clientelism; and third, tribalism. According to Nathan Allen's book "Clientelism and the Personal Vote in Indonesia," these three factors constitute the foundation for the emergence of power feminism in Indonesian local democracy. The emergence of such a pattern may undoubtedly be considered to have harmed the sustainability of democracy as well as the guarantee of the rule of law, which has allowed space for freedom of expression in the RHE contestation (Allen, 2012).

The incumbent's search for funds to stimulate dynastic political interests can be seen and suspected from his manipulative practice of his authority, specifically the increased use of social assistance funds and the large number of project inauguration agendas at the end of the incumbent's term of office (Tanjung & Faizal, 2021). Furthermore, clientelistic behaviors are mirrored in the dynasty's political achievements. For example, in the instance of dynasty politics in Riau Province, which was seen negatively since it may lead to manipulation of power attained. This manipulative activity occurs because when a government leader arises and is developed as a consequence of dynastic political activities, it triggers the placement of family, relatives, and organizations in crucial positions in government. Several issues have arisen as a result of Riau Province's hereditary political practice. The case of dynastic political practice in Riau Province is one example of power manipulation, one of which is nepotism (Darmansyah et al., 2020).

CONCLUSION

The prevalence of dynastic politics in Indonesia has a bearing on the country's democratic durability. In Indonesia, the continuation of dynastic politics is affected by a number of issues. As stated in Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Human Rights Law No. 39 of 1999, there are constraints controlling the right to be elected and to elect someone. Second, the revocation of article 7 letter r of Law No. 8 of 2015, which eliminates political dynastic impediments. Third, political parties are frequently trapped and prefer to propose candidates from the families of incumbents, and fourth, public education remains inadequate.

This has both positive and negative effects on the democracy's long-term stability. The positive outcome is that the incumbent's good performance sends a positive message to dynastic candidates in society, that political capital owned in the family environment has an effect on the quality of possible candidates, and that the continuity of ideas and ideas is excellent. Programs with simpler implementation. The negative effects are the creation of the KKN, the absence of checks and balances in government, the absence of political recruitment for the general public outside of the dynasty, and the development of policies that are not in the public interest.

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